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CLEAN AIR IN INDIAN COUNTRY: REGULATION AND
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
SANDRA D. BENISCHEK
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE recent publication of the Environmental Protection
Agency's Final Rule, Indian Tribes: Air Quality Planning and Man-
agement (hereinafter; Final Rule), establishes provisions for the
treatment of tribes "in the same manner as states" for implementa-
tion of the Clean Air Act (hereinafter CAA).' The Final Rule also
establishes requirements for tribal air management programs and
federal financial assistance for tribal air quality management.2 The
general areas to be addressed in this Comment are the legal
problems raised by the EPA's Final Rule for implementation of
CAA in Indian Country by tribal governments. 3
CAA is distinguished from other environmental acts affecting
tribes in Indian Country because it is a unique environmental act
1. See 63 Fed. Reg. 7254 (1998) (implementing 42 U.S.C. §7601(d) (1994)
Environmental Protection Agency, Indian Tribes: Air Quality Planning and Man-
agement). That section lays out that the EPA Administrator is to treat the tribes as
states. See id. The purpose of the Final Rule was to facilitate trial control of air
pollution within areas where the tribes have jurisdiction. See id. An EPA Final Rule
is also known as a promulgated rule which is published in the Federal Register
after the draft rule is published and the public comment period expired. For fur-
ther information on the Clean Air Act's promulgated rules see 42 U.S.C. §7607(5).
2. See 63 Fed. Reg. 7254, 7262-65 (1998) (discussing requirements for tribal
air management programs and federal financial assistance).
3. See Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Sac and Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 123
(1993) (holding tribal member's residence in Indian Country will limit state's ju-
risdiction for collecting taxes). "Indian country" is the area where there are tribal
and federal jurisdictions and is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1151 as:
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdic-
tion of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of
any patent, and, including rights of way running through the reservation,
(b) all dependent Indian communities within the boarders [sic] of the
United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired terri-
tory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a State, and (c)
all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extin-
guished, including rights of way running through the same.
18 U.S.C. §1151. The definition of "Indian Country" is found in the criminal code,
but it is also applied to civil jurisdictions. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S.
544, 559 (1981) (discussing tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers of tribe);
Oilphant v. Suquamish, 435 U.S. 191, 201 (1978) (holding Suquamish tribe lacked
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian living on reservation lands); Duro v. Reina,
495 U.S. 676, 681 (1990) (recognizing criminal jurisdiction over non-members of
tribe).
(211)
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that seeks to regulate mobile and stationary sources of pollution. 4
The regulation of air pollutants is very problematic; and the artifi-
cial boundaries of state and tribal authority, particularly in highly
populated areas, only create additional confusion. 5 CAA is cur-
rently characterized as a patchwork of regulation, and it is imple-
mented within each state through a State Implementation Plan
(hereinafter SIP). 6
The proposed and final rules of the EPA regulations imposed a
Tribal Implementation Plan (TIP) on Indian Country. 7 The TIP,
however, still leaves some questions unresolved. The procedure for
establishing a TIP includes shared responsibility, implementation,
accountability, and enforcement by EPA and Indian Country.8
These four elements lead to general policies for the implementa-
tion of CAA.
The Final Rule of CAA mandates that tribes be treated "in the
same manner as states," does not fit neatly within the broader goals
of CAA. 9 The intent of CAA was to "protect and enhance the qual-
ity of the Nation's air resources so as to promote the public health
and welfare and the productive capacity of its population."' 0 The
tribal governments lack the resources to implement the Final Rule
and as a result the plan falls short of stated EPA policy to develop
rules without unnecessary burdens."I Criteria for tribal govern-
4. Clean Air Act (codified at 42 U.S.C. §7410 et. seq. (1994)) [hereinafter
CAA].
5. SeeJill E. Grant, Delegation of Clean Air Programs to American Indian Tibes, in
THE CLEAN AIR HANDBOOK 7, 538-39 (RobertJ. Martineau, Jr. & David P. Novello
eds., 1998).
6. See id. at 33-47. A State Implementation Plan [hereinafter SIP] is a plan
adopted by a state which addresses how the state will implement, maintain and
enforce standards for air quality control. See 42 U.S.C. §7410.
7. See 59 Fed. Reg. 43956 (1994); 63 Fed. Reg. 7254 (1998) (setting forth pro-
posed rule for tribal implementation plan (TIP) for air quality); see also 42 U.S.C.
§7410(o) (providing "[if] an Indian tribe submits an implementation plan ... the
plan shall be reviewed in accordance with the provisions set forth in this section
for State plans, except as otherwise provided . . .").
8. See generally William H. Gelles, Tribal Regulatoy Authority Under the Clean Air
Act, 3 ENVTL L. 363, 381 (1997).
9. See 42 U.S.C. §7401 et. seq.; see also 63 Fed. Reg. 22602 (1998) (noting that
EPS's goals are to adopt less burdensome rules and to help build environmental
partnerships among its constituents).
10. 42 U.S.C. §7401(b)(1) (1994).
11. See Grant, supra note 6 and accompanying text (discussing intended goals
of Final Rule). The lack of financial resources presents a substantial problem to
achieving the intended goals of the Final Rule because full implementation of the
Final Rule incurs substantial costs to the tribe. See id.
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ments in administering CAA, however, are less rigorous than the
state criteria, and tribes are exempted from citizen suit provisions. 12
In addition, numerous legal issues arise from the Final "Treat-
ment As States" Rule (hereinafter TAS), because of legal or historic
definitions.13 Legal concerns in Indian Country include the follow-
ing: the ambiguous territorial authority given to tribes in the Final
Rule; the lack of due process provisions; and issues of environmen-
tal justice. Yet, for purposes of CAA, tribal authority is granted
"over all resources within exterior boundaries of reservation
lands."'14 In western states such as Oklahoma, the implications are
far reaching because most of the states include former Indian reser-
vation lands. ' 5
Recognizing jurisdictional questions with respect to tribal sov-
ereignty, EPA promulgated an Indian policy in 1984.16 "The heart
of the policy was centered around whether tribes should play a role
in partnerships between federal authority and tribal authority in In-
dian Country, modeled after the previous policy of federal-state
partnership."' 7 Through the Final Rule, EPA implemented tribal
air quality planning and management programs, hoping to achieve
the goal of independent tribal regulation of air pollution.18 Unfor-
tunately this goal was not met because there are still many practical
issues, including a tribe's ability to implement the regulations of
CAA, which must be addressed. 19 'Jurisdictional difficulties are en-
countered when a city or factory on a reservation creates pollution
12. See 63 Fed. Reg. 7254 (1998) (exemplifying that state and tribal criteria
are similar because both can impose more stringent standards than those of fed-
eral government).
13. See Grant, supra note 5, at 539 (explaining four criteria under §301 (d) (2)
that tribe must meet Linder CAA).
14. See 63 Fed. Reg. 7256 (referring to CAA §110(o) and §164(c)).
15. See 63 Fed. Reg. 7258. "The State of Oklahoma objects to the EPA's use of
the word 'reservation' because by federal law, the term 'reservation' can include
former reservations in Oklahoma which include approximately the entire State."
Oklahoma Tax Comm. v. Pottawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, 498 U.S. 505,
511 (1991) (defining reservation and trust lands in Oklahoma as being "validly set
apart" for the Potawatomis); see also 25 U.S.C. §1451. Trust land qualifies as a reser-
vation, for tribal immunity purposes, where it has been "validly set apart for the use
of the Indians as such, under the superintendence of the Government." United
States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 64849 (1978); see also Mescalero Apache Tribe v.
Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 14849 (1973).
16. See Mr. Leigh Price, Address at the Sovereignty Symposium XII, Tulsa,
Oklahoma (June 8, 1999).
17. See id. (discussing EPA's attempt to duplicate federal-state model of part-
nership with tribal governments.)
18. See Indian Tribes: Air Quality Planning and Management, 63 Fed. Reg.
7254 (Feb. 12, 1998).
19. See Grant, supra note 5, at 538.
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that has effects reaching across reservation, county, city, state and
perhaps national boundaries." 20 In an attempt to answer this ques-
tion, EPA, during the TAS policy formation, looked at the question
of congressional authority and determined CAA gave statutory au-
thority to the tribes.2 1 In contrast, enforcement of similar statutes
such as the Clean Water Act (hereinafter CWA) is delegated to
tribes only where tribes have their own authority.22 Also, the EPA
Final Rule does not address the consequences of tribal govern-
ments having jurisdictional authority over regulation of an existing
source that is concurrently regulated by another government.2 3
Due to the ambiguity of the Final Rule, the question, "who would
prevail in a dispute," causes confusion in a regulated industry under
SIPs and TIPs. 24
Without the cooperation of the states, the tribal CAA authority
creates interference and conflict with the SIP. Due to this conflict,
a regulated industry may unwittingly be caught in the middle of
EPA's attempt to please a multitude of jurisdictional interests, and
implementation may cause existing industries to withdrawal from
Indian Country to avoid the jurisdictional conflicts. 25 As a result,
the tribes may experience a reversal of the economic development
20. See Douglas Nash, International Law, Tribal Sovereignty and Air Pollution
24 (Mar. 29, 1971) (unpublished manuscript, available at University of New Mexico
Law School Library). Although all tribes are ultimately under the control of the
federal government, due to its sovereign status, the Indian situation is different.
Id. at 24.
21. See Mr. Jim Harvard, J.D, Address at the Sovereignty Symposium XII, Tulsa,
Oklahoma (June 8, 1999).
22. See id; see also Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 561-62 (1981) (dis-
cussing tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers of tribe).
23. See 42 U.S.C. §7411 (a) (6). Existing sources, namely those industries that
commenced operation prior to the rule, are potentially subject to both tribal and
state regulation. The term "existing source" refers to any stationary source other
than a new source. Id. The term "new source" means any stationary source, the
construction or modification of which is commenced after the publication of regu-
lations. See 42 U.S.C. §7411 (a) (2).
24. See Environmental Protection Agency, 59 Fed. Reg. 43959 (Aug. 25, 1994).
See generally Robert A. Wyman Jr. & Dean M. Kato, Meeting Ambient Air Standards:
Development of the State Implementation Programs, in THE CLEAN AIR HANDBOOK 7, 538-
39 (RobertJ. Martineau, Jr. & David P. Novello eds., 1998).
25. See Grant, supra note 5, at 8. For example:
At the same time as many CAA issues are complex and the outcome un-
certain, the stakes remain high. The future of entire industries can de-
pend on whether emission standards are set at levels that can be achieved
with current technology or require technological breakthroughs. The
EPA must phase out some products, may ban others and may regulate
pervasive products like consumer goods, autos and fuels. For company
managers to make decisions, they need skilled practitioners to guide
them through the maze.
Id. at 8.
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that tribes have long tried to achieve. 26 As the new regulator, tribes
must also be cognizant of industry pressure to regulate Indian
Country less stringently than the federal and state governments reg-
ulated it.27 The role of interest groups is well documented in the
federal regulatory process. 28 Supporters of the EPA argue that only
the national government is able to stand up to locally powerful in-
dustries. 29 However, federal agencies are experienced with political
and industry pressures through various forums.30
26. See David H. Getches, et al., Cases and Materials on Federal Indian Law 683,
683 (1998) (stating "[I]t is perhaps in the arena of economic development that
Indian tribes have made their most significant advances over the past half-century,
and their most significant impact on the larger society").
27. See Milo Mason, Snapshot Interview: Martha Provo, 9 Nat. Resources & Env't
48, 49 (1995). Martha Provo, Counselor to the Administrator on Indian Affairs at
EPA, is quoted as saying:
[h]istorically, EPA hasn't done much to help tribal governments assume
authority over federal environmental programs .... But EPA has virtu-
ally no field presence itself, so little has been done to carry out these
programs in some parts of Indian [C]ountry. And some unscrupulous
parties have taken advantage of that apparent gap in coverage).
Id.
28. See generally A. Lee Fritschler, Smoking and Politics: Policy Making and the
Federal Bureaucracy 8-22 (4th ed. 1989). The Council for Tobacco Research U.S.A.
was created by tobacco supporters to distribute funds for scientific research. Id. at
20. Other organizations were formed by the tobacco industry, such as the Tobacco
Institute, which hired a former U.S. Senator as its director. Id. at 21. "The slow-
ness of the government's response to the smoking studies of the 1950's was due in
part, to the successful efforts of the Tobacco Industry and in part to the relative
weakness of the public health interest groups." Id. at 22. "The skills of the To-
bacco Institute, enhanced by the sympathies of many members [of Congress],
helped to remove any doubts that might have existed in the Federal Trade Com-
mission or elsewhere as to the ultimate policy-making authority." Id. at 110.
29. See David Schoenbrod, Why States, Not EPA, Should Set Pollution Standards,
Envtl. Federalism, 268 (Terry L. Anderson et al., eds., 1997). Schoenbrod notes:
Concentrated interests buy "access" in Washington just as they buy "clout"
on Main Street .... While state and local playing fields are not perfectly
level, at least people know the score. It would be hard to find an Arkan-
san who does not know the Tyson poultry folks have clout in Little Rock.
But at the federal level, the workings of concentrated interests are
shrouded by remoteness, size and complication of the federal
government.
Id. at 269.
30. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 745-46 (1972) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting) (referring to enormous pressures on agencies for favorable action). Doug-
las stated:
"[t]he federal agencies to which I speak are not venal or corrupt. But
they are notoriously under the control of powerful interests who manipu-
late them through advisory committees, or friendly working relations, or
who have that natural affinity with the agency which in time develops
between the regulator and the regulated";
Id.; see also Vine Deloria, Jr., GOD is RED 321, 323 (Grosset & Dunlap, eds., 1977).
Justice Douglas' dissent was the first major attempt in American jurisprudence to
incorporate a modern understanding of nature into law. See id. at 321.
2001]
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Section II of this Comment concerns the criteria, uniqueness,
and policies of CAA. 31 Section III will consider legal issues raised
by the Final Rule.3 2 Whether or not EPA set up the treatment of
tribes as states under CAA to promote success or failure of tribal
jurisdictions is explored in Section IV.-" Finally, Section V will
search for alternatives and offer suggestions for an appropriate ap-
proach to regulate air pollution on tribal lands.3 4
II. CLEAN AIR ACT
CAA seeks to control national air quality and provide for regu-
lation of air pollution within the context of federal, state, and local
partnerships.3 5 There are three important points in the partner-
ships of the various governments in implementing CAA. First, CAA
established that the federal government is responsible for creating
National Ambient Air Quality Standards (hereinafter NAAQS).36
Next, the national government must set forth technology-based
standards for individual discharges of air pollution.3 7 Finally, CAA
is implemented by individual states, which in turn, submit SIPs for
air quality to EPA in order to meet the federal standards.3 8
31. For a discussion of the policies behind CAA, see infra notes 35-42 and
accompanying text.
32. For a full examination of the implications of the Final Rule, see infra
notes 43-113 and accompanying text.
33. For a discussion the effects of the implementation of CAA on tribes and
tribal jurisdiction, see infra notes 114-124.
34. For a comprehensive analysis of the alternatives to CAA in regulating air
quality in tribal lands, see infra notes 125-159.
35. See Grant, supra note 5, at 2.
36. See Michael R. Barr, Introduction to the Clean Air Act: History and Perspective,
in THE CLEAN AIR HANDBOOK 1, 5 (RobertJ. Martineau, Jr. & David P. Novello eds.,
1998).
37. See Steven Ferrey, ENVrL. L., 141, 146 (Aspen Law & Business, ed., 1997)
(discussing results of 1970 amendments to CAA). Before the 1970 amendments,
there were no enforceable national air quality standards and states set the stan-
dards to limit air pollution. Id. at 141. The 1970 amendments created a federal/
state partnership. Id. at 141. "The federal role was to create: (1) nationally uni-
form quality standards for ambient air, and (2) technology-based standards for
individual polluters' emissions." Id. at 141.
38. See Grant, supra note 5, at 5-6; see also 42 U.S.C. §7410(a-p) (discussing
process by which SIPs are adopted for air quality standards). The process for adop-
tion of a SIP begins when each state submits a SIP for attainment of primary Na-
tional Ambient Air Quality Standards [hereinafter NAAQS]. Id at 144. The SIP
includes predictions for each air quality region where the standards are in danger
of being exceeded and the emission reductions necessary to avoid exceeding those
standards. Id. at 144. "After a SIP is submitted, EPA has four months to make a
finding that accepts, accepts in part, or rejects the plan in whole or in part. If the
plan is adequate the EPA must approve it. Once approved by the EPA, the state
and local regulations in the SIP become enforceable as federal law." Id. at 144.
6
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The states are also charged with the regulation of individual
permits for industries that emit air pollutants. 39 Air pollutants are
divided into two categories: "mobile" and "stationary".40 The stated
purpose of CAA is "to protect and enhance the quality of the Na-
tion's air resources as to promote the public health and welfare." 4'
Congress recognized the nature of air pollution as a mobile prob-
lem that required regulation at the source of the problem. 42 Con-
sequently, the mobile character of the pollutant necessarily
distinguishes regulation of air pollution from other environmental
statutes.
In 1990, Congress amended CAA and provided that Indian
tribes should be treated as states under CAA. 43 The TAS section
fosters the development and implementation of particular sections
of CAA on tribal lands.4 4 Tribal participation in CAA programs is
voluntary and requires the submission of an application for EPA
approval.
A tribe must meet four criteria to qualify for tribal implementa-
tion of any portion of CAA. 45 First, the Indian tribe must be feder-
ally recognized. 4 6 Second, the Indian tribe must have a governing
39. See Fritschler, supra note 28, at 140-45 (discussing regulations of air pollu-
tion prior to 1970 and also 1970 amendments to CAA).
40. See id. at 140 (stating, "[m]obile sources include automobiles, buses,
trucks, trains, airplanes and tunnels that exhaust vehicle fumes. Stationary sources
include factories, power plants, or any structure or facility that emits a significant
amount of pollutant into the air.").
41. 42 U.S.C. §7401(b)(1); see also H.R. Rep 101-952, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
(October 26, 1990) "Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Confer-
ence" (explaining congressional intent in passing 1990 CAA).
42. See 42 U.S.C. §7401 (a) (3) (noting that reduction or elimination of air pol-
lution and control of such pollution control at its source are primarily responsibil-
ity of states and local governments).
43. See 42 U.S.C. §7601 (d) (2) (a-c) (describing when it is appropriate to treat
Indian Tribes as states); see also 59 Fed. Reg. 13820, 13820-21 (1994) "Indian
Tribes: Eligibility of Indian Tribes for Program Authorization."
44. See 42 U.S.C. §7601 (d) (2) (a-c).
45. See 59 Fed. Reg 42956, 43968 (1994) "Indian Tribes: Air Quality Planning
and Management." The tribes are not required by the 1990 Amendments to im-
plement the entire CAA program but can qualify for portions of CAA. See 63 Fed.
Reg. at 7263. EPA developed a comprehensive strategy which addresses two major
concerns in Indian Country: "(1) Gaps in Federal Regulatory programs that need
to be filed in order for EPA to implement the CAA effectively in Indian Country
where tribes opt not to implement their own CAA programs; (2) identifying and
providing resources, tools, and technical support that tribes will need to develop
their own CAA programs." Id. For example, the air permitting program require-
ments for major or minor sources of air pollution emission in non-attainment ar-
eas have not been issued by EPA. See id.
46. See 42 U.S.C. §7602(r) (describing term "Indian Tribe" as "any Indian
tribe, band, nation, or other organized group or community, including Alaska Na-
tive village, which is Federally recognized as eligible for the special programs and
7
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body that carries out substantive governmental duties and powers,
as defined by EPA.47 Third, the tribe must be able to perform func-
tions that "pertain to the management and protection of air re-
sources within the exterior boundaries of the reservation or other
areas within the tribe's jurisdiction."4 Fourth, the tribe must be
"capable, in the judgment of the Administrator [of the EPA], to
carry out the functions to be exercised in a manner consistent with
the terms and purposes" of CAA.4 9 On the other hand, if a tribe
does not seek TAS approval, EPA has the responsibility of adminis-
tering air pollution regulations in Indian Country.50
The delegation of authority under CAA differs from other envi-
ronmental statutes with regard to the delegation of authority to
tribes. The delegation of authority to tribes in CAA requires the
same criteria for eligibility of TAS approval but is more extensive in
jurisdiction and coverage of land area. 51 For example, EPA deter-
services provided by the United States to Indians because of their status as Indi-
ans"); see also State of Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government, 101
F.3d 1286, 1291 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding Alaskan Native villages have same sover-
eign rights as other Indian nations).
47. See 42 U.S.C. §7601(d) (2) (a).
Although no longer "possessed of the full attributes of sovereignty," they
remain a "separate people, with the power of regulating their internal
and social relations." United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381-82
(1886). See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978). They have
power to make their own substantive law in internal matters. See Roff v.
Burney, 168 U.S. 218 (1897) (membership);Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1,
29 (1899)(inheritance rules); United States v. Quiver, 241 U.S. 602
(1916) (domestic relations), and to enforce that law in their own forums,
see, e. g., Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 555 (1981).
48. See 42 U.S.C. §7601(d) (2) (b); see also Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v EPA, 211
F.3d 1280, 1285 (D.C. Cir. 2000). The EPA correctly interpreted the statute to
express Congress' intent to grant tribal jurisdiction over nonmember owned fee
land within the reservation without need to determine, on a case-specific basis,
whether the tribe possesses inherent sovereign power. See id. The term "reserva-
tion" includes formally designated reservations, as well as trust lands that are val-
idly set apart for use by the tribe despite that land not being formally designated as
reservation. See 42 U.S.C. § 7610(d) (2) (B). This includes pueblos and tribal trust
land. See id.
49. See 42 U.S.C. §7601 (d) (2) (c).
50. See 42 U.S.C. §7601 (d) (4). EPA will administer CAA provisions if the In-
dian tribe does not administer the program. See id. "In any case in which the
Administrator determines that the treatment of Indian tribes as identical to states
is inappropriate or administratively infeasible, the Administrator may provide by
regulation, other means by which the Administrator will directly administer such
provisions as to achieve appropriate purpose." Id.; see also Philips Petroleum Co. v.
EPA, 803 F.2d 545, 563 (10th Cir. 1986) (holding EPA is empowered by Congress
from Safe Drinking Water Act to implement underground injection control pro-
grams on Indian lands).
51. See Grant, supra note 5, at 539.
8
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mined that section 518(e) of CWA delegates authority to tribes only
over land within a tribe's reservation. 52 Additionally, a tribe, under
TAS provisions of CWA, must demonstrate it presides over all land
it claims it has authority over, even if the land in question is within
the boundaries of the reservation. 53 The Safe Drinking Water Act
(hereinafter SDWA) also requires the tribe to establish its jurisdic-
tion for each area regulated. 54 Nevertheless, SDWA is broader than
CWA since it requires that tribal authority be exercised "within the
area of the Tribal Government's jurisdiction. 15 5 Both EPA and
CAA interpret this to mean Indian Country.56 Tribal authority, to
qualify as a state under CAA, requires tribes to manage and protect
"air resources within the exterior boundaries of the reservation or
other areas within the tribe's jurisdiction." 57 This definition is un-
clear. Hypothetically, a non-Indian, who owned land within the
boundaries of the reservation and decided to build a cement fac-
tory on his land, could do so within Indian Country. Assuming the
tribe had CAA program authority, there is confusion as to whether
the tribe or the state would be the entity to permit the cement fac-
tory. Under the Supreme Court's decision in Montana v. United
States,58 specifically that tribes do not regulate non-Indians, the au-
thority would fall to the federal government.59
CAA criteria for state authority differ from tribal authority in
enforcement provisions, deadlines for program implementation,
52. See id. (noting that EPA will interpret the provision broadly to include
tribal trust land outside boundaries of official reservation).
53. See id. (noting tribes must prove on case-by-case basis that they possesjuris-
diction over land outside reservation and non-Indians).
54. See 63 Fed. Reg. 7256.
55. See Grant, supra note 5, at 539 (citing 42 U.S.C. §300j-1I(b) (1) and 33
U.S.C. §1377(e)). "The only real difference between the three TAS provisions is in
the wording of the jurisdiction criterion, and of the three, the CAA provision . . .
provides for delegation to tribes over the broadest area of land with the most cer-
tainty as to the scope of jurisdiction." Id.
56. See Grant, supra note 5, at 540.
57. 42 U.S.C. §7601(d) (2) (b). See generally 61 Fed. Reg. 30472, 30473-74
(1996) (EPA Proposed Rules: Authorization of Indian Tribes Hazardous Waste
Program under RCRA Subtitle C); 61 Fed. Reg. 2584, 2586 (1996) (EPA Proposed
Rules: Subtitle D Regulated Facilities; State/Tribal Permit Program, Determina-
tion of Adequacy; State/Tribal Implementation Rule (STIR)).
58. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
59. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 558-61 (1981) (stating that
although tribes may prohibit or regulate hunting or fishing by nonmembers on
land belonging to tribes or held by United States in trust for tribes, it has no power
to regulate non-Indian fishing and hunting on reservation land owned fee by non-
members of tribe).
2001]
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and sanctions for failure to comply with deadlines. 60 EPA ex-
empted the tribes from the enforcement sanction provisions since
participation in state air programs are mandatory while tribal air
programs are voluntary. The tribes cannot be penalized for failing
to implement a voluntary provision. 61 Other than the exceptions
outlined, tribes are subject to the same requirements as states in-
cluding air quality requirements as stringent as CAA.62 Tribes, in
most cases, can implement more stringent standards than CAA.63
In many instances, courts have upheld tribal environmental stan-
dards, which are more stringent than those, established by EPA.64
The tribes are subject to sanctions if they fail to adequately en-
force an EPA program.65 Yet, criminal enforcement provisions of
CAA will not be available to the tribal governments, due to their
limited criminal jurisdiction. 66
III. LEGAL ISSUES AND TRIBAL MANAGEMENT OF CAA PROVISIONS
There are three significant legal issues that arise with respect to
tribal management of CAA. First, the definition of Indian Country
is ambiguous due to historical and territorial authority over tribal
60. See Grant, supra note 5, at 542 (noting that EPA has determined that dead-
lines imposed on states are inappropriate for tribes since implementation of CAA
is voluntary in Indian Country - i.e. stringent deadlines which must be met by
states are inapplicable).
61. See id. Tribal sovereignty, a recurrent theme in this Comment, is given
strong deference by the courts. See Grant, supra note 5, at 345.
62. See id. (noting tribes must implement CAA standards which are at least as
strict as states provisions).
63. See id. at 542 n.19.
64. See City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 865 F. Supp. 733, 741 (D.N.M. 1993)
(mem.), affd, 97 F.3d 415 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 410 (1997) (ex-
panding tribal authority of environmental protection outside boundaries of tribal
lands). The City of Albuquerque brought a suit against EPA for the agency's ap-
proval of the Isleta Pueblo water standards under the CWA. See id. The Rio
Grande River flows from northern New Mexico through Albuquerque and Isleta
Pueblo southward. See id. Under the TAS provisions of CWA, EPA approved the
Pueblo's establishment of "ceremonial use" as a designated use of the Rio Grande
River. See id. The Isletans used the river for religious ceremonies that required
tribal members to drink and emmerce themselves in the Rio Grande. See id. In
one instance, EPA suggested that the Pueblo consider relaxing the standards dur-
ing low flow periods. See id. As a response, the Pueblo refused to relax the stan-
dards because their members generally used the river "more intensively for
ceremonial purposes during low flows." Id. at 741.
65. See id. Nevertheless, in Browner, the Tenth Circuit recognized that EPA
dealt squarely with the Pueblo regarding the tribe's authority "to develop water
quality standards more stringent than those of the federal government," and simul-
taneously rejected the City's position to the contrary. Id. at 740.
66. See id. The Declaratory Judgment Act "does not enlarge the parties' sub-
stantive rights." Id. at 737.
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lands.67 Second, regulated industries lack remedies since tribes are
immune from lawsuits under tribal sovereignty. 6 Additionally, ex-
cept in extreme cases, courts will give the tribal decisions defer-
ence. 69 Third, environmental justice concerns of industries can be
exacerbated by tribal implementation of air regulations.
Initially, the territorial authority given to tribes, defined as In-
dian Country, is ambiguous as it includes former Indian lands no
longer held by Indians.7 0 In addition, tribes can have jurisdiction
over former reservation lands. Moreover, tribal lands, which are
held in trust by the federal government, can constitute a tribal res-
ervation for CAA. 71 Tribal authority to regulate air pollution and
quality is derived from two sources: (1) delegation from Congress
to EPA, and (2) inherent tribal sovereignty to regulate conduct
within the tribal jurisdiction as defined in case law. 72 It is a widely
accepted point of law that, through a statute, Congress may dele-
gate federal authority to a tribe.73 EPA, in implementing CAA, del-
egated federal authority to tribes to administer CAA in the same
manner as states.
74
EPA exercises its rule-making authority by promulgating final
rules for tribal authority and implementing CAA within the exterior
boundaries of the reservation. 75 Several commentaries to the pro-
posed rules state CAA did not expressly delegate authority to tribes
67. See id. Steffani A. Cochran, Treating Tribes as States Under the Federal Clean
Air Act: Congressional Grant of Authority-Federal Preemption-Inherent Tribal Authority, 26
N.M.L. REV. 323, 329 (1996). Amendments to CAA set forth in 1990 "first estab-
lished tribes as state provisions." Id. at 326.
68. See Santa Clara v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978) (holding suits against
Indian tribes barred by sovereign immunity absent clear waiver by tribe or congres-
sional abrogation). A female member of the Santa Clara Pueblo was denied the
tribal membership for her children after she married a non-member of the tribe.
See id. Tribal membership, however, was extended to male members of the tribe
who married non-members. See id. The Supreme Court held the Indian Civil
Rights Act "does not impliedly authorize actions for declaratory judgement or in-
junctive relief against either the tribe or its officers". Id. at 72.
69. See Montana, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) (noting "inherent tribal sovereignty" is
grounded in Court's holding). Before the Europeans came to North America, the
tribes were self-governing sovereign political communities. See id.
70. See Grant, supra note 5, at 545 (discussing various goals of CAA).
71. See Harvard, supra note 21 (considering remarks made at Sovereignty Sym-
posium XII).
72. See Cochran, supra note 67, at 323.
73. See United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 554 (1975) (referring to Article
I, §8, of the Constitution giving Congress power "[to] regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes").
74. See 42 U.S.C. §7601 (d) (implementing CAA 1990 Amendments will dele-
gate EPA federal authority to tribes who met criteria).
75. See 63 Fed. Reg. 7254 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837,
842-45 (1984)).
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as required by the Supreme Court.7 6 Tribal regulatory power is not
applicable to lands held in fee by non-Indians unless the conduct
threatens or has direct effect on the tribe's health or welfare, politi-
cal, and economic integrity.7 7 According to the Supreme Court,
Indian tribes do not have authority to zone former Indian lands
now held in fee by a majority of non-Indians. 78 In sum, EPA inter-
prets CAA "as an explicit delegation of federal authority to eligible
tribes. It is not necessary for the EPA to determine whether tribes
have inherent authority over all sources of air pollution on their
reservations. '79
The next significant legal issue concerning implementation of
TAS incorporates the regulated industries lack of due process provi-
sions. Regulated industries claim their lack of remedies amounts to
a denial of due process since tribes are immune from suits under
the rule of tribal sovereignty.8 0 Tribal governments are not re-
quired to provide an opportunity for interested parties to seek judi-
cial review of permit applications.8' Judicial review of tribal actions
imposes significant practical burdens because of the tribes remote
distances from federal district courts.82
76. See 63 Fed. Reg. 7255; see also Montana, 450 U.S. at 566 (holding non-
Indian hunting and fishing did not threaten Crow Tribe of Montana's "political or
economic security to justify tribal regulation"); Brendale v. Confederated Tribes
and Bands of the Yakima Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 428 (1989).
There is no contention here that Congress has expressly delegated to the
Yakima Nation the power to zone fee lands of nonmembers of the Tribe
.... Therefore under the general principle enunciated in Montana, the
Yakima Nation has no authority to impose its zoning ordinance on the
fee lands owned by petitioners Brendale and Wilkinson.
Id.
77. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 555-56 (discussing tribal membership, and regula-
tion of hunting and fishing on tribal lands).
78. See Brendale, 492 U.S. at 423 (noting Indians relinquished many of their
sovereign rights when they executed treaties with United States).
79. See 63 Fed. Reg. at 7257. "EPA believed that this 'territorial approach...
best advances rational, sound, air quality management."' Id. at 7255.
80. See Santa Clara v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56-58 (1978).
81. See Fed Reg. at 7261-62 (noting that due to tribal sovereignty, interested
parties may not seek judicial review of CAA permits).
82. See Martinez, 436 U.S. at 64 (noting "the cost of civil litigation in federal
district courts, in many instances located far from reservations, doubtless exceeds
that in most tribal forums"). Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §7601 (d) (4), EPA has author-
ity to exempt tribes from judicial review requirements of CAA. See Arizona Pub.
Sen,. Co. v EPA, 211 F.3d 1280, 1286 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
Thus, EPA indicated its willingness 'to consider alternative options, devel-
oped and proposed by a tribe in the context of a tribal CAA Title V pro-
gram submittal, that would not require tribes to waive their sovereign
immunity to judicial review but, at the same time, would provide for an
avenue for appeal of tribal government action or inaction to an indepen-
12
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More important, allowing citizens to sue for enforcement of air
pollution regulations would subrogate the sovereignty of the
tribes.8 3 Tribal governments are not subject to citizen suit provi-
sions of CAA.8 4 Citizen suit provisions serve an important role as
"watchdogs" for enforcement of the statute.
Generally, CAA permits a public interest group or citizen to
seek penalties against EPA or a private party for violations.8 5 A citi-
zen bringing a suit must provide the non-complying regulated
source owner or operator and EPA with sixty days notice prior to
filing the suit to allow an opportunity for compliance.86 In decid-
ing a citizen suit, the court can assess damages or issue an injunctive
order for injunctive relief compelling compliance with the regula-
tion.8 7 EPA, however, relies on Santa Clara v. Martinez.8 8 In Marti-
nez, the Court held that unless congressional intent indicates
otherwise, tribes enjoy sovereign powers that provide them immu-
nity from suits for declaratory or injunctive relief.89
dent review body and for injunctive-type relief to which the Tribe would
agree to be bound.
63 Fed. Reg. at 7262.
83. See 41 AM.J.2D INDIANS 32 (1995). One commentator notes:
In the absence of an unequivocal expression of contrary legislative intent,
suits under the Indian Civil Rights Act against a tribe, which possesses the
common-law immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign
power, are barred by the tribes sovereign immunity. Therefore, the Act
does not subject tribes to the jurisdiction of the federal courts in civil
actions for injunctive or declaratory relief.
Id.
84. See 63 Fed. Reg. at 7262. Citizen suit provisions of CAA authorize a citizen
to bring a civil action in court against any person or company alleged to have
violated an emission standard or limitation. See id. 42 U.S.C. §7604. The violation
could have occurred in the past or present. See id.
85. See Grant, supra note 5, at 515. Civil penalties under the citizen suit provi-
sions are at the discretion of the judge using the "penalty assessment factors set out
in CAA Section 113(c)." Id. at 517.
86. See id. EPA can intervene in a citizens suit at any time during the suit. See
id. at 516.
87. See id. Penalties awarded under citizen suits are deposited into a fund and
made available for EPA compliance activities. See id. EPA and the Department of
Justice are allowed 45 days after final judgement to submit comments to the court.
See id. at 517.
88. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
89. See Martinez, 436 U.S. at 61; see also Santa Clara v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49
(1978) (discussing implied authorization of Indian Civil Rights Act for relief of
private actions against tribal officers when tribal members' civil rights were de-
nied). The Court determined that Congress' failure to provide relief other than
habeas corpus was deliberate. See id. Suits against the tribe under the Civil Rights
Act were therefore barred by the tribe's sovereign immunity from suit. See id. Any
deviation therefrom thus would constitute ajudicial intrusion into the Indian Civil
Rights Act. See id.
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The third legal issue is the possible acceleration of environ-
mental justice concerns due to tribal implementation of air regula-
tion.90 "Environmental justice demands that public policy be based
on mutual respect and justice for all peoples, free from any discrim-
ination or bias."91 In 1994, the Clinton administration issued an
executive order regarding environmental justice; it requires federal
agencies to demonstrate that their programs and policies do not
inflict unfair harm on minorities and low-income people. 92 The en-
vironmental justice movement has two characteristics: a grass-roots
composition and a politicizing effect. 9 3
Generally, environmentalists claim that environmental degra-
dation harms all of society equally.94 Nevertheless, environmental
justice focuses on the suffering of environmental risks, which are
skewed to the persons least able to afford protection from the deg-
radation. 95 Environmental risks are also defined as the costs which
result from the exploitation of a natural resource. 96
Costs and benefits of pollution are not distributed equally in
society.97 The environmental justice movement has attempted to
re-frame the debate to focus on reducing waste production at the
source of its origin. This new focus is a change from the traditional
90. See generally, An Indian Country Guide: Environmental Justice, A Bibliography
for Native American Studies 1, (Native Ecology Initiative, eds.) August 31, 1997
(listing bibliography for Native American and environmental studies).
91. Andrew Dobson, Justice and the Environment: Concepts of Environmental Sus-
tainability and Theories of Distributive Justice 21 (1998) (Andrew Dobson, ed.) (an-
nouncing "Principles of Justice" and quoting from Richard Hofrichter, Toxic
Struggles: The Theory and Practice of Environmental Justice 237 (1994)). "Principles of
Justice" was adopted at the First National People of Color Environmental Leader-
ship Summit in Washington, D.C. in October 1991.
92. See Exec. Order No 12, 898, 3 C.F.R. § 859-63 (1995) (requiring federal
agencies to demonstrate that their programs and policies do not unfairly inflict
environmental harm on poor and minorities).
92. See Thomas Lambert et al., A Critique of "Environmental Justice", 8 NAT'L LEGAL
CENTER FOR THE PUB. INT. WHITE PAPER 1 (1996) (discussing Clinton Administra-
tion's attempt to address environmental racism).
93. See id. at 22. A "grass-roots composition" can also be thought of as the
groundwork or origin meaning the most basic level of organization run by citizens.
See id. The "politicizing effect" in this context means that the movement must have
an effect or influence over politics in order to enact change. See id.
94. See id. at 19 (contesting notion that certain discrimination is to blame for
current environmental disparity).
95. See id.
96. See Eldon D. Enger et al., ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE: THE STUDY OF INTERRE-
LATIONSHIPs 519 (2d ed. 1986) (referring to definition of "environmental cost" as
"perceived degradation of the environment resulting from the exploitation of a
natural resource").
97. See Grant, supra note 5, at 539 (quoting Bob Edwards, "With Liberty and
Environmental Justice for All: The Emergence and Challenge of Grassroots Environmental-
ism in the United States" 36 (1995)).
14
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 12, Iss. 2 [2001], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol12/iss2/1
CLEAN AIR IN INDIAN COUNTRY
idea which merely regulated the disposal of waste.9 8 The environ-
mental justice movement differs from environmentalism in that the
former does not intend or pretend to address the full range of envi-
ronmental concerns.99
The view of Indians as the first ecological conservationists has
been widely promoted by the environmental movement. 1°  Yet,
Chief Seattle's famous environmental speech was, in fact, found to
be mostly fictional. 10 1 In reality, the history of Indian resource use
is not at all compatible with the spiritual connection attributed to
Indians and the natural resources. 10 2 Indians used the resources
available to them whether or not they were "living in harmony with
nature." 10 3 In the present day though, positive incentives for good
stewardship are the best method of resource conservation in Indian
Country. 0 4 In contrast to yesteryear, environmental issues are just
98. See Grant, supra note 5, at 590.
99. See id. at 545. Environmental justice addresses primarily social, economic
and health concerns of persons affected by pollution. See id. Environmentalism
goes further in addressing the actual effects of the pollution, such the groundwater
table and vegetation. See id.
100. See Terry L. Anderson, Conservation Native American Style, in BREAKING THE
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY GRIDLOCK, (Terry L. Anderson, ed.) 1, 2-3 (1997) (illustrat-
ing how American Indians used complex institutions to conserve natural
resources).
101. See Fergus M. Bordewich, Killing the White Mans Indian, a Book 131-33
(1996) (stating "[Chief] Seattle is said to have delivered this speech in response to
President Franklin Pierce's offer to buy the tribe's land near Puget Sound in
1854"). Chief Seattle is quoted as saying, "We are part of the earth and it is part of
us. The perfumed flowers are our sisters; the deer, the great eagle, these are our
brothers. The rocky crests, the juices in the meadow, the body heat of the pony,
and man all belong to the same family." Id. at 132. Bordewich remarks that Seat-
tle's speech has lent credence to the romantic notion that Indians view the land in
"poetic passivity" and are opposed to any commercialization of the earth. See id. at
132. "The speech as it is known to most Americans is, quite simply, an invention, a
fact that seems to make little difference to well-meaning whites who are deter-
mined to portray Indians as Icons of ecological correctness." Id. at 133.
102. Id. (dispelling the myth of Indians as "icons of ecological correctness").
103. See Anderson, supra note 100, at 4 (quoting Louis S. Warren, "SEEING THE
PEOPLE FOR THE TREES: THE PROMISE AND PITFALLS OF INDIAN ENVIRONMENTAL His-
TORY" OAH Magazine of History, 19 (1996). Warren stated:
To claim that Indians lived without affecting nature is akin to saying that
they lived without touching anything, that they were a people without
history. Indians often manipulated their local environments, and while
they usually had less impact on their environments than European colo-
nists would, the idea of 'preserving' the land in some kind of wilderness
state would have struck them as impractical and absurd. More often than
not, Indians profoundly shaped the ecosystems around them.
Id.
104. See id. at 18 (discussing Indian culture can manage resources without
constraints and myths of non-Indians).
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as important to a tribe's economic viability as it is to a tribe mem-
ber's quality of life and health. 10 5
Environmental protection for indigenous people is a human
right beyond a regulatory regime imposed by a national govern-
ment. 111r Tribal officials have balanced issues of sovereignty and ec-
onomic development in environmental policy. In New Mexico, the
Mescalero Apache, after some lengthy debate, accepted a proposal
to locate U.S. Department of Energy nuclear wastes at a temporary
site on their tribal lands. 0 7 The Mescalero contend the issue is an
expression of their sovereignty, and they have the right to store nu-
clear waste on tribal lands. 108 Critics state that tribes are selling
their sovereignty. 10 9 Critics also state the issue is not sovereignty,
but preservation of ecology, survival, and environmental racism. 10
Tribal environmental policy should be sensitive to ecological con-
cerns, economics, contemporary scientific knowledge, and tribal
systems of ethics."' The goals of economic development should be
balanced with environmental concerns. "The goal is to minimize
error and to maximize adaptation to move forward to reduce the
ravages of poverty and stasis." 112 Environmentalism upholds Indi-
ans as guardians of the earth but "finds no way to prevent the indus-
105. See Fritschler, supra note 28, at 51.
106. Dean B. Suagee, Human Rights and Environmental Protection in Indian
Country 9 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 74, 75 (1995) (discussing that Indian people
have human rights which should not be ignored in resolving conflicts with non-
Indians over governance of Indian reservations).
107. Grace Thorpe, Our Homes are Not Dumps: Creating Nuclear-Free Zones, 47,
53, in DEFENDING MOTHER EARTH: NATIVE AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES ON ENVIRONMEN-
TAL JUSTICE (Jace Weaver, ed.) (1996) (discussing environmental justice from a
Native American perspective). Environmental justice requires "an analysis of sov-
ereignty and the legal framework that governs environmental matters in Indian
Country." Id. at 108.
108. See id. at 53 (noting that this argument is based on tribal sovereignty and
right of tribal government to govern itself and use of its lands).
109. See id. at. 53-54 (noting that tribes supporting nuclear sites are selling
tribal sovereignty by using tribal governments and trust lands to by-pass environ-
mental regulations).
110. See id. at 55 (stating "it is the worst kind of environmental racism" to
force tribes to live with nuclear waste due to their rural locations).
111. See Rebecca Tsosie, Tribal Environmental Policy in an Era of Self Determina-
tion: The Role of Ethics, Economics, and Traditional Ecological Knowledge, 21 VT. L. REv.
225, 226 (1996) (noting that American Indian nations must choose between pres-
ervation and ensuring economic development in lands now seen as a commodity
containing natural wealth).
112. Frank Pommershiem, Economic Development in Indian Country: What Are
The Questions? 12 AMER. INDIAN L. REV. 195, 200 (1984) (examining scholarly writ-
ing on economic development in Indian Country and suggesting new ways to re-
spond to challenge by examining past experiences and creating solutions with
tribal constraints in mind such as culture, rural locations, and need for training).
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trial machine from grinding up both people and habitat in its
insatiable need for raw materials."'" 3 There are more questions
than answers with regard to how Indians view their environment.
The conclusion affirms that Indians should continue to be given
the opportunity and resources to define their concept of the envi-
ronment and of how to manage their own resources.
IV. EPA ESTABISI-SHMENT OF TRIBAL CAA MANAGEMENT: WILL IT
SUCCEED OR FAIL?
EPA, under the authority of CAA, promulgated its Final Rules
on tribal management of air pollution.' "4 The intended result for
independent tribal regulation of air pollution is inconsistent with a
national system of air pollutant regulations. Tribal governments
lack the resources required for implementation or accountability.
To receive federal funding for air management programs, CAA's
1990 Amendments require a five percent matching rate for
tribes.' 5 Without adequate resources tribal management of air
pollution amounts to another unfunded mandate of the federal
government." 6 The infrastructure in some tribal governments,
however, lacks the resources needed to enforce CAA regulations.
Without the proper infrastructure in tribal governments, EPA TAS
provisions are merely "smoke and mirrors."
In issuing the final TAS rule, EPA was aware that the tribes
lacked the resources to carry out CAA and stated that, "the biggest
problem is limited resources in EPA and the tribes." 117 Tribes do
not have the same basic law of regulation and infrastructures as
state governments.11 8 The Environmental Protection Agency re-
port Environmental Equity: Reducing the Risk for all Communities (1992)
creates the impression that communities are actively trying to re-
113. Vine Deloria, Jr., Indians and Anthropologists: The Critique of Anthropology,
(Thomas Biolsi & LarryJ. Zimmerman, eds.) 211, 213 (1997) (stating "American
Indian delegations have been active in world environmental movements but have
brought only a romantic sentimentalism as their contribution"). Indians are inter-
viewed on numerous documentaries discussing "mother earth" only to have the
destruction continue. See id.
114. See 63 Fed. Reg. at 7259 (intending to treat Indian tribes in same manner
as states).
115. See Grant, supra note 5, at 543.
116. See generally Eileen M. Luna, The Impact of the Unfunded Mandates Reform
Act of 1995 on T7ibal Governments, 22 Am. INDIAN L. REV. 445 (1998) (reevaluating
federal governments power over tribal government).
117. See Fritschler, supra note 28, at 48 (discussing opportunities for EPA to
help tribal environmental regulatory programs in Indian Cotntry).
118. See id. at 49 (recognizing tribal limitations in meeting EPA standards).
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cruit noxious facilities.' 19 Native Americans are prime targets for
the waste disposal industry. 120 Both the U.S. Department of the In-
terior and the Bureau of Indian Affairs are promoting economic
development of the Indian lands through the construction of waste
facilities. 121 Indians are not recruiting pollution industries to their
tribal lands. 122 Tribes are concerned about the cumulative effects
of air permits and the need for timely environmental assess-
ments.123 Despite the lack of resources EPA provides to the tribes,
the agency is thinking about using the federal government as a neu-
tral vehicle to manage programs and facilitate discussions between
states and tribes. 124
V. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
There are three approaches to the management of the envi-
ronment, including ecosystem management, environmental enter-
prise zones and environmental federalism. Ecosystem management
encompasses the effects of alterations to one part of the ecosystem,
and it induces changes throughout the ecosystem. 125 Ecosystem
management is a collaborative approach integrating ecological, ec-
onomic and social factors as well as partnerships with federal, state
and local governments, Indian tribes, private landholders and other
stakeholders.126 "The notion that humans threaten their own sur-
vival by their exploitation of nature is a theme that predates the
Industrial Revolution."'127 Critics of the ecosystem management
119. See Robert Bullard, Confronting Environmental Racism: Voices from the Grass-
roots, 200-01 (1993) (discussing and analyzing EPA's failure to grasp how interplay
of race and class bias environmental decision-making).
120. See id. The governments of more than a hundred reservations have been
approached by waste disposal firms. See id. at 201 (citation omitted).
121. See id.
122. See id. (discussing that Native Americans are targets, not recruiters for
location of waste industry on their lands).
123. See Shirley Nordum, Leech Lake DRM, DEBAHJI MAN, Aug. 1999, at 3.
124. See 63 Fed. Reg. at 7258 (discussing the possibility of EPA as a mediator
in discussion between tribes and states).
125. See Ronald N. Johnson, Ecosystem Management and Reinventing Government,
in BREAKING THE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY GRIDLOCK, (Terry L. Anderson, ed.) 23
(1997) (examining Ecosystem Management Task Force Report (1995), theory of
ecosystem management, and problems created by this approach).
126. See id. The objectives of ecosystem management are offered by the Inter-
agency Ecosystem Management Task Force: "The goal of the ecosystem approach
is to restore and sustain the health, productivity, and biological diversity of ecosys-
tems and overall quality of life through a natural resource management approach
that is fully integrated with social and economic goals." Id. at 23.
127. See id. at 27 (noting that concerns over finite land base, long-term supply
of natural resources and growing population date to late sixteenth century writings
of Mathus).
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model suggest that the supporters of the model are suffering under
the delusional belief that restoration of natural environments will
lead to economic growth. 128 Legitimately, greater economic
growth affects the environment in a positive way. For example, in a
good economy people have disposable income which they can
devote to more abstract concerns, such as the environment, and
worry less about affording the basic necessities. 129 Ecosystem man-
agement consists of a multi-specialty approach which must be fur-
ther defined, and perhaps modified, if implemented in the tribal
environmental management context.
Environmental Enterprise Zones (hereinafter EEZ) are sug-
gested as one potential avenue for environmental management in
the tribal environmental management context. EEZs would oper-
ate as market forces, property rights, and decentralized regula-
tions.' 30 "Environmental protection can rest on either side of the
fence, which is to say control is either a matter of law and market
forces or a struggle with the rule of politics."'' 1 The "fence" re-
ferred to is the "constitutional fence that separates private and pub-
lic decision making."' 3 2 European countries, such as France and
Germany, protect water quality through the use of quasi-public
river basin associations.13 3 These associations provide for water
quality rights of every member (industry, residents and municipali-
ties); but require payments from dischargers based on the quality of
their discharge.' 34 In the United States, similar examples of envi-
ronmental regulations exist which are not limited by monopolistic
control by regulators. 35 For example, California developed an air
emissions trading market, where "credits for emissions are bought
128. See id. at 33.
129. See id. at 35 (discussing meritorious hypothesis that "high income coun-
tries do more to clean and maintain the environments than do poorer countries").
130. See Bruce Yandle, Environmental Regulation: Lessons from Past and Future
Prospects, in BREAKING THE ENIRONMENTAL POLICY GRIDLOCK, (Terry L. Anderson,
ed.) 161, 162 (1997).
131. See id. at 142 (discussing "constitutional fence" that separates public and
private environmental decision making).
132. See id. The "public fence" is the U.S. Constitution, which protects citi-
zens from "the unrestrained forces of government." Id. at 143. The "private fence"
is the common law as established by the judiciary, market forces, opportunity costs
and also embodied in property rights. Id. at 144.
133. See id. at 154 (discussing that European countries use economic incen-
tives to manage environment by requiring "all dischargers to make payments on
the basis of the quality of their discharge" assuming it is a permitted type).
134. Id. (stating "Some discharge is not allowed at all").
135. See Yandle, at 161 (examining North Carolina Tar-Pamlico Association,
water-pollution trading community which was formed to share costs and reduce
discharges into river basin).
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and sold."'136 The proponents of EEZ state that the role of "central-
ized" authorities should be limited to setting standards for environ-
mental problems which are national in scope, monitoring
outcomes and working with national industries to streamline their
production processes. 137
The principle of environmental federalism may "maximize the
costs of monitoring regulatory agencies", and "authority to [do so]
should devolve to the lowest level of government that also allows for
control of pollution or other spillover effects." 138 Critics of environ-
mental federalism state that returning environmental regulation to
state and local control would destroy the progress made in the last
three decades. 139 Proponents of environmental federalism see the
increased role of the states as "breaking the yoke of a monopoly
regulator" who applies uniform rules for varied situations. 140 The
monopoly regulator is the federal government. A case study of
eight states west of the Mississippi River demonstrated a successful
history of dealing with water and water pollution issues.' 4' If regu-
latory control of the environment were given to the states, with full
EPA approval as to water quality management, the states would con-
tinue to emulate the command and control process of EPA.142
Conversely, those states without EPA approval would continue their
individual approaches to water quality management. 43 The ideal
regulation of the environment "differs from place to place and os-
136. Id. at 161 (citing Benjamin A. Holden, "Dirt in Hollywood? Californians
Have Pollution-Rights Market Ready For It," WALL STREETJOURNAL, April 12, 1995
at B 3).
137. See id. at 163-64 (noting that market forces and flexibility should be pre-
eminent in facing challenges with limited resources).
138. Terry L. Anderson and Peter J. Hill, Environmental Federalism: Thinking
Smaller, in ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM, Xi, xiv (Terry L. Anderson and PeterJ. Hill,
eds.) (1997) (exploring environmental policy from decentralized approach build-
ing on success of state in solving problems).
139. See Karol Ceplo and Bruce Yandle, Western States and Environmental Feder-
alism, in ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM, 225, 226 (Terry L. Anderson and Peter J.
Hill, eds.) (1997) (noting that critics of environmental federalism view EPA as om-
nipotent regulator of environment).
140. See id. (discussing that environmental regulation return to state and local
control would offer opportunities for protection and encourage reliance on mar-
ket forces).
141. See id. at 226-27 (analyzing statistics, administrative law, common law and
property rights for eight states). The states examined were: Arizona, California,
Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oregon, and Texas. See id. at 228-42.
142. See id. at 243 (predicting gradual adjustment to more flexible and inno-
vative regulation).
143. See id. (predicting tighter standards where benefits are highest and more
relaxed standards where ecosystems are not as threatened).
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cillates within any one."' 44 In contrast, centralized command and
control regulation, as exercised by the federal government, "tends
toward homogeneity and stability" because of insufficient data gath-
ering and the lack of incentives for remotely located bureaucrats to
act on behalf of the client. 45 Additionally, the property rights pro-
tection movement seeks to limit the role of the federal government
in property rights, and is linked to movements to decentralize con-
trol of environmental protection from the federal to local govern-
ments. 146 States are ideologically more attuned to their citizens and
can facilitate these property rights discussions in the venue of their
state legislatures. In the same vein, tribal governments are ideologi-
cally attuned to the needs of the tribal members.
There are several models of delegation of authority of federal
environmental regulations. Dual federalism is the traditional fed-
eral-state model. 147 The dual federalism model finds both state and
federal governments supreme in their respective arenas. 4 Many
environmental acts, including the CWA, have shifted from dual fed-
eralism toward delegation of authority of programs to tribal govern-
ments. Cooperative federalism involves the partnership of federal,
state, and tribal governments regulating the environment. 49 This
new brand of federalism, manifested in the "block grant" aid pro-
grams which evolved during the Reagan Administration, shunts the
authority and responsibility of the federal government to state and
144. David D. Haddock, Federal Systems: Origin, Decline, Prospects in ENVIRON-
MENTAL FEDERALISM, 1-3, 16 (Terry L. Anderson and Peter J. Hill, eds.) (1997)
(discussing erosion of federalism due to National government role in massive
problems which states cannot deal with efficiently).
145. See id. (noting that centralized regulation is costly and in many cases
inappropriate).
146. See id. at 252.
Concern over property rights protection led to failed efforts in the early
1990's to gain federal legislation. Later, the 10 4th Congress added prop-
erty rights protection to its Contract with America.... [n]o action was
taken.... By September 1995, property rights bills had been introduced
in forty-three states and passed in eleven of them. At the time, every state
west of the Mississippi except Arizona, Oklahoma, and North Dakota was
either debating or had passed legislation.
Id. at 252-53.
147. SeeJames Q. Wilson, American Government Institutions and Policies, 48, 56
(1986) (discussing federalism and its history in United States).
148. See id. (noting that national government became more powerful than
states due to difficulty in regulating interstate commerce).
149. SeeJoshua D. Sarnoff, Cooperative Federalism, The Delegation of Federal Power
and the Constitution, 39 ARiz. L. REv. 205, 212-22 (1997) (explaining why Congress
enacts cooperative Federalism statutes and arguing point of view that Constitution
does not encourage Congress to do so).
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local governments.' 50 A federalism model, based on cooperative
management, rests as a superior stance to implement environmen-
tal regulation of air pollution. 51 Cooperative federalism is a partic-
ularly functional model for tribes to carry out CAA's objectives.
Tribes have entered into Memoranda of Understanding with state
environmental departments to coordinate regulation and enforce-
ment activities. 152 Memoranda of Understanding can serve as train-
ing opportunities for tribal governments. Interests of states and
tribes are optimal if both parties work together in cooperation.
53
For example, New Mexico entered into agreements with twenty-two
tribes whose lands are within state borders.1 54 The parties agreed
to establish a procedure to resolve environmental issues. 155 Agree-
ments with tribal governments provide the necessary resources, ex-
pertise, and testing facilities which the state can provide. 56 The
most applicable solution to the tribal management of environmen-
tal programs is cooperative management federalism. The manage-
ment regime is a policy which involves a number of social partners
in an collaborative attempt to resolve specific environmental
problems. 57 These cooperative regimes have two characteristics.
First, a process of consensus through a series of exchanges and in-
teractions with social organizations and administrations to reach a
150. SeeJohn Harrigan, Politics and Policy in States and Communities, 45 (1988)
(noting that another solution is to enact a tribal mini-NEPA); see generally Dean B.
Suagee and Patrick A. Parenteau, Fashioning A Comprehensive Environmental Review
Code For Tribal Governments: Institutions and Process, 21 AMER. INDIAN L.REv. 297, 298
(1997) (explaining that EPA issued numerous amendments to its regulations to
establish procedures for tribes to be treated as states).
151. See Daniel J. Fiorino, Environmental Policy and the Participation Gap, in DE-
MOCRACY AND ENVIRONMENT: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS (William Lafferty andJames
Meadowcraft, eds. 1996) 194 (stating that consequences of few opportunities for
democratic participation in environmental policy decisions are public protest and
dissatisfaction).
152. See Grant, supra note 5, at 545 (noting that Memoranda of Understand-
ing are common way for states and tribes to work out jurisdictional disputes in
regulating environment).
153. See William H. Gelles, Tribal Regulatoy Authority under the Clean Air Act, 3
ENr'L LAw 363, 402 (1997) (explaining that interests of states and tribes are best
served when both parties cooperate).
154. See id. at 403 (discussing State of New Mexico's Government-to-Govern-
ment Policy Agreement with twenty-two tribes within state borders).
155. See id. (explaining that both parties have committed to address environ-
mental issues and problems through cooperative procedures predicated on mutual
respect and sovereignty).
156. See id. at 404 (noting that because many tribes lack resources to regulate
effective!y, several states offer tribes their expertise, testing facilities, and testing
programs to evaluate compliance with tribal environmental standards).
157. See Pieter Glasbergen, Learning to Manage the Environment, DEMOCRACY
AND ENVIRONMENT: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 183 (William Lafferty et al. eds.,
1996).
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negotiated solution must exist. 158 Second, each participant as-
sumes some responsibility for the implementation of the negotiated
solution. 15 9 The implementation may involve selling the plan to
the group membership or entering into legal covenants with state
or local governments for implementation.
VI. CONCLUSION
The EPA Final Rule established tribal implementation of CAA
provisions through its TAS rule. CAA, a unique environmental reg-
ulatory act due to the mobile nature of the pollutant, presents spe-
cial problems for tribal implementation. As a result, legal concerns
need to be remedied prior to full implementation. These concerns
include the unclear tribal authority, jurisdiction over non-Indians,
and issues of environmental justice. Challenges to tribal sover-
eignty should remain the jurisdiction of the courts. Moreover,juris-
dictional concerns of non-Indians and the immunity of tribes from
suit can be negotiated by the entities. Additionally, concerns of en-
vironmental justice should be discussed in the regulatory process.
Overall, legal precedent regarding any of the preceding issues will
also need to be examined.
These undefined areas can be illuminated by public participa-
tion of the tribes, states, and regulated entities in the decision mak-
ing process. Contrary to the opposition's views, tribal sovereignty
will remain intact and not be diminished by the cooperative agree-
ments with other entities. EPA suggests establishing the agency in
the role of negotiator and/or facilitator in the TAS regulatory pro-
cess as a solution. In addition, tribal governments should be given
the resources and clear authority to implement CAA TAS rules.
Consequently, the best method to remedy these undefined areas is
to use a cooperative management model. Most importantly, the tri-
bal governments can enter into cooperative agreements with states
and regulated entities to resolve these issues on a case-by-case basis.
158. See id. at 257 (noting that cooperative management regime is model
which encourages participation of wide range of environmental organizations
while avoiding problems such as polarization of interests).
159. See id. at 258 (stating "At its simplest this may involve 'selling it' to their
broader constituency").
2001]
23
Benischek: Clean Air in Indian Country: Regulation and Environmental Justice
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2001
24
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 12, Iss. 2 [2001], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol12/iss2/1
